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Viewing cable 06BERN1280, IRAN: LARIJANI MEETS WITH SWISS FM CALMY-REY \

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Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
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Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #**06BERN1280**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
06BERN1280	2006-07-10 14:51	2011-08-30 01:44	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Bern

Appears in these articles:

http://www.letemps.ch/swiss_papers

VZCZCXRO4324
OO RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSW #1280/01 1911451
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 101451Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY BERN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2621
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

2006-07-10 14:51:00 06BERN1280 Embassy Bern CONFIDENTIAL VZCZCXRO4324\
OO RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR\
DE RUEHSW #1280/01 1911451\
ZNY CCCCC ZZH\
O 101451Z JUL 06\
FM AMEMBASSY BERN\
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2621\
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY\
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERN 001280 \
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STATE FOR P - U/S BURNS \
STATE ALSO FOR EUR, ISA, NEA \
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/10/2016 \
TAGS: [PREL](#) [KNNP](#) [PARM](#) [ETTC](#) [SZ](#)
SUBJECT: IRAN: LARIJANI MEETS WITH SWISS FM CALMY-REY \
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Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Carol Urban, Reasons 1.4 b/d \
\
1.(C) Summary: Iranian Nuclear Negotiator Ali Larijani met \
with Swiss Foreign Minister Micheline Calmy-Rey on July 8, as \
part of his ongoing European road show. According to Swiss \
officials, Larijani tried to convince the Swiss that Iran was \
seriously looking at the latest P5 1 package but would not be \
kept to deadlines, such as the G8 Summit, merely to oblige \
other powers. Calmy-Rey reiterated Swiss support for a \

diplomatic solution and urged the Iranians to fulfill their \ IAEA obligations, if they wished to have their NPT rights \ respected. The Swiss viewed Larijani's European tour as an \ effort to lay the groundwork for future negotiations. End \ summary. \

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2.(C) Swiss State Secretary of Foreign Affairs Michael Ambuehl, as part of his pledge to Under Secretary Burns to \ keep Washington apprised of developments with Iran, on July \ 10 offered Charge a readout of the July 8 meeting between FM \ Calmy-Rey and visiting Iranian negotiator Larijani. Swiss \ DFA disarmament specialist Jean-Daniel Praz and Poloff joined \ the meeting. According to Ambuehl, the meeting was short -- \ one hour, with interpreters reducing by half the amount of \ time spent in actual exchange of views. The Swiss chose not \ to hold a press conference afterward, while the Iranian \ Embassy gave two journalists a brief readout. Delegation \ members were as follows: \

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Iran: \
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Ali Larijani, Secretary, Supreme Council for National Security \ Javad Va'idi, Director for International Security, SCNS \ Sa'id Jalili, Dep. Foreign Minister for Euro-American Affairs \ Ibrahim Rahimpour, MFA Director General for Western Europe \ Majid Takht-Ravanchi, Iranian Ambassador to Bern \

\
Switzerland \
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Micheline Calmy-Rey, Foreign Minister \ Michael Ambuehl, State Secretary of Foreign Affairs \ Livia Leu, Director for Near East & Africa \ Jean-Daniel Praz, Deputy Director, Disarmament & Arms Control \

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3.(C) Starting out the meeting, Calmy-Rey explained that \ Swiss policy favored non-proliferation and disarmament, the \ peaceful use of nuclear energy, and a diplomatic solution to \ the dispute through existing multilateral organizations -- \ primarily the IAEA. Calmy-Rey told Larijani that she saw \ three reasons for hope in the current situation: \

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-- The United States seemed ready to participate in \ negotiations; \
-- The P5 1 share a fairly homogeneous position; \
-- Initial reaction from Tehran has been measured. \
\

(Unstated but implied in Calmy-Rey's discourse, Ambuehl \ suggested, was that Iran would not find it easy to divide the \ international community as long as the P5 1 could hold \ together.) \
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4.(C) Larijani told Calmy-Rey that Iran was examining the \ package seriously and would reply with its own proposals. He \ added that there remained several "ambiguities" in the \ package that would need to be clarified. Tehran could accept \ no preconditions. Tehran would also not be bound by \ deadlines designed to serve such events as the coming G8 \ Summit in St. Petersburg. Larijani told Calmy-Rey that a \ month or so either way should not matter, quipping "Iran \ can't build a bomb in a couple of weeks." \
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5.(C) Addressing continued IAEA dissatisfaction at Iranian \ cooperation, the Swiss delegation told the Iranians that, if \ they wished their rights respected, they needed to fulfill \ their obligations, particularly the need to clarify the \ pre-2003 situation. Ambuehl said that Larijani responded in \ a typical manner that the IAEA maintained a double standard \ against Iran (as compared with Sweden, South Korea, Japan, \ and Argentina) and that, no matter how many questions Iran \ answers, the IAEA always has more questions. \
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Ambuehl's Take on the Meeting \
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6.(C) Ambuehl saw Larijani's motive for his European tour as \ wanting to lay the groundwork for negotiations. He sensed no \ attempt to divide the Swiss from the P5 1. Beyond this, our \ Swiss interlocutor did not think it necessary to look too \ deeply at Iranian intentions. "They are really not so sly," \ Ambuehl observed. The cancellation of Va'idi's scheduled \
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BERN 00001280 002 OF 002 \
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visit in June he ascribed to normal Iranian disorganization. \
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7.(C) Surveying Iranian relations with the P5 1, Ambuehl \ mentioned that he saw a remarkable homogeneity among members. \
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He said that, during his recent visit to Beijing, Chinese \\ officials had voiced concerns about Iran and he received the \\ impression that China placed more weight on good relations \\ with the United States than with Iran. Iran seemed to view \\ China as an important economic partner, but not completely \\ reliable. Ambuehl thought that Iran was less interested in \\ Russian technology than Western. Iran viewed France as an \\ interested seller; Germany as the most flexible of the major \\ powers; the UK as a close U.S. Ally, and the United States as \\ the country with the most say. \\

8.(C) Asked why Larijani paid a visit to Bern, Ambuehl \\ estimated that Iran respected Switzerland's neutrality, \\ independence, and lack of an agenda. Switzerland was non-EU \\ and non-NATO but was technologically advanced and had an \\ established nuclear energy sector supplying 40 percent of its \\ own needs. Ambuehl stressed that neither side mentioned \\ Switzerland's role as protecting power for the United States \\ in Tehran. He further described as ridiculous a recently \\ heard European concern that the USG was trying to bypass the \\ EU-3 by opening up channels to Tehran via the Swiss. \\

9.(C) Finally, Ambuehl offered his thoughts on how to handle \\ Iran. He observed that the Iranians approach discussions \\ with a chip on the shoulder, as if everyone believed them to \\ be inferior. The Iranians had a particularly acute need for \\ respect. Rather than push for an earlier response to Iran, \\ Ambuehl suggested that the P5 1 merely call Iran on its own \\ August 22 date. Ambuehl also suggested that the five nuclear \\ states be more mindful of the perceived "unfairness" of the \\ NPT when dealing with non-nuclear states -- even such \\ likeminded states as Switzerland and Ireland. \\

URBAN \\